period during the middle of that month, and 12,558 on the single day of 20
October.
4 Prima facie, these are for the most part war refugees, who on the basis of both international law and past practice, can expect to be granted asylum if they get an opportunity to apply for it within recipient countries of the EU. 5 Germany is the destination of choice. From 1-29 September 2015, more than 169,000 additional refugees were registered in Bavaria alone.
6
Unsurprisingly, more than two-thirds of the current wave of asylum seekers are young adult men, blazing the trail for their kin as they brave the hardships of an uncertain journey.
This sudden and massive flow of population has already had a substantial impact on the domestic politics of most European countries. It has generated new tensions, and exacerbated pre-existing ones, between the member states of the EU, and promises to be critically important for the Union as a whole. The crisis also bears on Europe's security choices vis-à-vis the conflicts in the Middle East. This impact will be magnified as a function of the duration and the scale of the refugee crisis.
Strictly speaking, the current flow of refugees is not unprecedented in numerical terms, nor from the standpoint of its consequences -human, strategic or otherwise. Events such as the Vertreibung (eviction) of the German-speaking population of Central and Eastern Europe at the end of the Second World War, the partition of India in 1947, the Palestinian Nakba (catastrophe) of 1948 and the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan displaced people on a scale and at a tempo at least comparable to, and sometimes greater than, the ongoing exodus.
7
From a European standpoint, the wars of Yugoslav succession of 1992-2001 offer some elements of comparison: close to 1.5 million war refugees from Bosnia in 1994, and 900,000 Kosovars uprooted in 1998-99. 8 The flow of Bosnian refugees towards the EU was gradual, however, and therefore relatively manageable. The surge of Kosovar refugees was quite sudden, but it was comparatively modest and handled on the assumption that their stay would end after a brief and successful war.
There is no precedent for such a large and abrupt flow of war refugees from the Middle East to Europe. The exodus is poised to continue, moreover, at a sharp tempo and on a massive scale, with only occasional respites as high winds and choppy seas deter passage. There are in excess of 4m
Syrian refugees registered with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in the Middle East, primarily in Turkey (2m-plus),
Lebanon (close to 1.1m) and Jordan (some 630,000). 9 The ongoing war in Syria provides no prospect for their early return home. The shortfall in the funding required by the UNHCR to ensure the survival of the refugees in 2015 -currently assessed by the organisation at more than $2.5 billion -hardly makes it possible to sustain, let alone increase the numbers of displaced people living in these countries, even if the $1.1bn promised by the EU in September were to be released quickly. 
The crisis revealed new fault lines
a physical barrier to entry, he was acting no differently than other countries that had built razor-wire barriers, with EU acquiescence, such as Spain (along its border with Morocco) or indeed Greece itself, which had sealed its land border with Turkey some years earlier.
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The bigger development was the extreme reluctance from the Baltic states, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia to accept any EU burdensharing scheme, variously invoking their relative poverty, the intrinsic difficulties of accepting deeply alien outsiders or even the refusal of hosting and attacks from her right-wing coalition partners in the Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU).
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German power, EU division Foreign capitals were less than thrilled, however, by Berlin's activism. This remarkable development, along with the outcome of the latest euro crisis, has led to a discussion on the emergence of a 'German horizontal of power' (in contrast to the Kremlin's 'vertical of power') in a gradually integrating EU. 28 In this view, the EU gains greater cohesiveness with a softpower Germany acting as the pacesetter at its core, successfully countering the forces of extremism and defying many outside observers' low expectations as to the survivability of the EU and its works, not least the euro.
Some EU integration is occurring in order to reinforce the prospects of the euro's survival, and this process is heavily influenced by Germany's policy choices. This, however, is a largely technocratic process: integration by stealth. As a deliberate and political process, federalism, in the sense in which that concept is used in countries such as the US, Brazil or Switzerland, has ceased to be on electoral offer in the EU, as is demonstrated by its absence in the 2015 elections for the European Parliament. This process predates the refugee crisis. Jürgen Habermas's constitutional patriotism -the idea of identifying with a constitution and its values, rather than with a nation and a territory -had already been dealt a body-blow in 2005 with the failure to ratify the European constitutional treaty. 29 Then came the divisive and apolitical manner in which the EU's members, notably an increasingly influential Germany, and the 'Institutions' chose to respond to the successive economic crises that began with the recession of 2008. 30 On a hot-button issue such as population movement, integration by stealth of the sort practised in the economic and financial arena will be even less likely to prove politically sustainable. Norms are not a substitute for policy, nor can they be counted on to provide a shared sense of purpose in the face of crisis.
The resort to qualified majority voting is not so much a sign of the emergence of a European demos as it is a sign of overstretch. Germany has indeed proven to be at the centre of Europe's response to the refugee crisis (such as it is), but with little power, horizontal or otherwise. The forces of souverainisme will continue to develop to varying degrees in most EU member states. For its part, the UK will find it more difficult to resist the temptation of exit from an EU in which population issues are dealt with by qualified majority voting.
In short, the refugee crisis is aggravating and accelerating the economic, social and political consequences of Europe's inability to deal jointly and severally, in an effective and legitimate manner, with the challenges of our age. The EU may survive more or less completely, with all or some of its current powers. But its constitutional and strategic ambitions of barely more than ten years ago are already receding in the mist of the pre-crisis age.
31
Just standing still is made more difficult by the refugee crisis. a 'safe zone' in northern Syria, to the re-launching of the stalled negotiations for Turkey's entry into the EU. 32 Some of these items are immediately germane to migration and refugee issues, such as visa regimes and asylum policies. Turkey is a key strategic and political player in the handling of the situation in Syria generally: the refugee crisis will increase the attention paid to it in the EU overall, and notably in Germany, with its massive Turkish community. With a GDP close to half of Russia's, Turkey is the EU's sixth-largest trading partner, ahead of Japan, India and Brazil. 33 In turn, the EU is by far Turkey's largest partner, with more than 40% of its trade. 34 If its political scene allows it, Turkey is set for a step change in European, and specifically in German, geostrategic and geo-economic policymaking. The refugee crisis may accelerate that process -provided Turkey does not fall prey to political instability.
Dancing with wolves

What is to be done?
The EU has every incentive, but only limited means, to reduce the effects given number of asylum seekers into the EU: this would help eliminate the hazardous and disruptive sea and land voyage from Turkey to Europe. 35 It is as yet unclear whether a deal will first occur as a result of a German bilateral initiative or in the framework of EU-Turkish discussions.
At the other end of the line, the EU must comprehensively review its current rules and organisation vis-à-vis asylum seekers: the Dublin rules are simply not working. In the short term, asylum regimes will become more restrictive, notably for claimants from so-called 'safe countries' in the Western Balkans, 36 and less generous in terms of benefits. New legislation is being enacted to that end in Germany. At the time of writing, the EU was also considering the provision of shelter for some 100,000 refugees in These fears may be misplaced. The EU has managed to muddle through an uninterrupted string of crises during the last ten years, and this one may be no different. However, muddling through is no panacea: like every policy course, it has its own limits, and these are being tested as never before. 
Notes
